



By LIEUTENANT GENERAL MASAHARU HOMMA
AfIIOfI9 .... OUCllllllCU", JtJtJIvrN oj 1M fir. rear oj 1M O1VJItJr Eewl ...i4ia IVor
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p'" 40.- 11..~ aM _ oj Iti. td_ on 1M ftlbjecl. He doelJ il witll
t1Ie ..mpH a,ld fOrctJJul clGriIr oj a greaI MJlditJr.-K.M.
I N the Pacific war, a large number oflanding operations were conducted by
the Japanese forces under the Southern
Cross: in Malaya, Hongkong, Djawa,
Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines, the
Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and other
islands. Without a single exception,
these operations have proved to be re-
markable SUC0088e8, thus upeetting past
theory, which regarded landing opera-
tions as a matter of extreme difficulty.
Just as we find verv few battles in the
history of war which were fought in
Similar circumstances, no two of the
above landing operations resembled each
other in such points as tho ratio of the
army, naval, and air forces of the two
opponents, the conditions of enemy de-
fense on land, the coast line and the
conditions on tho coast, the distance
between port of departure and destina-
tion, wind and waves (especially the
height of breakers), etc. CoD8equently,
it is unsafe to draw any basic conolusion
from a limited number of examples.
However, it is not neoeesarily mere specu-
lation to seek for a general outline of
landing operations from among many
experiences.
I am not trying to compose a funda-
mental outline of this kind from my
o~ experiences. I shall only attempt to
put down some of these experiences as
proof of one or the other contention,
which may be of some value.
EXPERIENCES IN OALLIPOLI AND CRI~A
The failure of the British landing
operations on the Gallipoli Penin~ula
during the Great War offered much
material for study with reference to
operations of this kind. At the samo
time, this crushing defeat resulted in the
idea that the strategy of landing opera-
tions was extremely difficult, even to the
extent of their being almost imposaible.
Hence, the success of a series of landing
operations conducted during the course
of the China affair. including the famous
landings in Hangchow Bay and Bias
Bay, as well as those on the banks of
the Yangtze River, the coasts of Hainan
Island, at Foochow, etc., constituted a
miracle in the war tactics of that time,
neoeesitating a revision of the ideas
formed by the Gallipoli operations. The
reason for these 8Uocesaes is to be found
in the faot that strategic secrecy was
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fully maintained and that the operations
took the enemy by surprise.
Even though our enemies nrc on the
lookout for our landings, it is impossible
for them constantly to station powerful
forces everywhere along their extRnded
line of defense. Precaution is, after all,
only precaution. If a defender attempts
constantly to maintain powerful unit.s at
a frontal line where it is by no means
certain whether his opponent will try to
make a landing, the defender is bound
soon to feel a shortage of men at other,
more urgent fronts. In other words, the
defender has 11 weak point which it is
difficult for him to eliminate. If it is
possible for a rll,ider to take advantage
of this weak point amI surprise the
enemy both at the opportune time and
at the proper point, it is more or less
certain that the landing will be a success.
Therefore the key to the succe,ss of a
landing operation is t-o take the enemy
by surprise. This is an iron rule.
AVIATION L~D ~IERICAN PREPARATIO,"S
The progress of aviation has made
landing operations more difficult than at
the time of Gallipoli, since a landing
attempt may now be diScovered by the
enemy's scouting planes long before the
landing point is reached and, after reach-
ing its anchorage, the group of transports
becomes a target for enemy bombers.
For this reason, the acquisition of the
command of the air is an indispensable
condition for large-scale landing opera-
tions. Such operations without com-
mand of the air make communications
with the rear extremely difficult.
In the operations in the Philippines, I
could not rid myself of the impression of
the failure of thc GaUipoli undertaking,
notwithstanding the successes' achieved
in Hangchow and Bias Bays. So I was
prepared' for the loss of an enormous
amount of vessels, man power, and
material.
We knew that the US Far Eastern
Fleet had ita base on Luzon Island, and
from various iuformation we had to
assume that the American air foree. in
the Philippines had been reinforced so.
as to number more than 300 aircraft just
before the outbreak of the war. More-
over, we were aware that the US-Filipino
forces believed that Japan would under-
take her main O]lCratiOJl in Lingayen Gulf
in the ca·se of a landing attempt and had
been constantly holding maneuvers in this
district. Hence it was against all our
expectations for us to gain such easy
successes in our landing operntions there.
SUCCESSES Olo' THE \'.~NGUARD
Immediately after the commencement
of hostilities, our vanguards carried out
successi~e lan~ings on Luzon at Aparri,
Vigan, and Legaspi, and on Mindanao
,,"t, Davao' (see maps in January 1942
iSl:lue, p. 16 and February 1942 issue,
p. 148).. Our forces were not discovered
while aboard the transports and were
offered no resistance from the land worth
mentioning excep~ at Davao.
However, after reaching their anchorage
at all of these places, our vanguard was
subjected to the attacks of the enemy
aircraft. Also, and particularly at Aparri,
our transports were attacked by enemy
submarines while at anchor. Fortunately,
our 1088C8 caused by t.hese attacks were
trivial. At Aparri, seven or eight tor-
pedoes discharged by enemy vessels
passed under the bottoms of our trans-
ports and hit the shore. Although enemy
bombers also followed us tenaciously; not
a. single vessel was dealt a fatal blow.
Following these vanguard unite, the
main units of our forces, divided into ..
n umher of transport groups, departed
from home esc.orted by a convoy fleet.
Together with squadrons of warships they
headed for Lingayen Gulf and Lamon
Bay in stately formation. By this time,
our ca.mpaign against the enemy air
force had alreadv scored remarkable suc-
cesses, and the ~ter part of the latter
had been annihilated. Nevertheless, a.
considerable number of enemy planes were
still continuing. t,heir activities. More-
over, '86veral enemy submarines were
keeping 'a vigilant watch, cruising about
in certain waWl'S. We therefore thought
it unavoidable that our Beeta of trans-
ports would, because of their size, be
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eventually discovered, no matter how
.l1tiously we ohoee our courses.
But, once we had sailed, we discovered
that all the planes appearing over us
were our own, meant to cover our opera-
tions, and we did not see a single one
marked with stars. Moreover, the
enemy's Far Eastern Fleet seemed to
have moved toward southern waters,
since not a single vessel was sighted by
QI. Thus we were able to arrive at our
appointed anchorage at the appointed
iime and cast anchors in unison. This
wu the caee both in Lingayen Gulf and
in Lamon Bay.
LANDINO PREPARATiONS
Next morning, several enemy fighter
planes came to attack our transports, but
they were repulsed by our fighter planes.
We were also attacked by enemy sub-
marines, but our 1088e8 were not great.
By that time, the enemy had already
lost most of his bombers. If a powerful
.enemy airforce had still existed then, we
were 8ure that our 108&e8 would have
amounted to several times the numl)('r
that we actually suffered.
Both at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon
.Bay the main forces of the coastal defellS('
were in the areas close to the head of
the bay, while a part of the defense was
at important points some ditltance away
from the head, where it was thought that
landings could be effeeted fairly eaaily.
In the Lingayen sector our transports
were fired on by heavy field artillery, but
our loeses were negligible. As we antic-
ipated the cnemy's defense to be solid
along the bead of the bay, and as we
&110 wanted to avoid having to operate
ita ·8Wampy areas immediately after land-
... we did not select the head of the
-y .. our point of landing. Conse-
~y it was only at the enemy's posi-
tIoDa l&r away from the head of the bay
&bat a part of our forces made forced
IandiDga involving fighting on the beach.
TBBOUOH TII:E SURB
Although the obstruotion caused by
enemy artillery fire was lees than we had
oounted on, that caused by the waves
came quite unexpectedly. At this season
of the year, wind and waves should have
been quiet along the coast of Lingayen
Gulf, and, as we had been favored with
fine weather on the previous day, we
carried out the landing in full confidence.
However, as a result of low atmospheric
pressure over the western China Sea
several days before, there were huge
breakers along the coast reaching to a
height of nine feet. A group of vessels
which went towards the coast loaded
with the first landing units was im-
mediately washed onto the beach and
could not return to the transports. So
we were forced to stop the landing.
There was no telling whether these high
waves would die down on the following
day.
If the enemy commander had been
ambitious and had wanted to make "
positive offensive, this was his best
chance. But the enemy missed this
unique opportunity. At Lamon Bay the
enemy likewise attempted only partial
resistance, and no large-scale sally was
staged.
The rcnsons for the SllCCC88 of these
landing operations were (1) that the
activity of the enemy naval and air forces
was greatly reduced; (2) that there were
big gaps in the American and Filipino
defense positions; and (3) that the enemy's
land defense forces had made neither
plans nor the necessary preparation8 to
start a bold offensive against the units
already landed or to attack the enemy
in tho midst of landing.
LANDINO OK OTHER ISLANDS
In all the later landing operations
oarried out in the following months on
Cebn and Panay Islands as well as at
Cotabato on Min~lanao, the American and
}'ilipino forces limited themselves to
applying the "scorched-earth" policy,
senselessly setting fire to the towns and
villages along the coasts where we landed.
From a military point of view, they did
practically nothing except carry out a
few air raids on our transports and
landing forces. By no means could the
enemy's resistance on the coast be called
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severe fighting. This means that the
enemy, although on the watch for the
landing of our forces, could not take
appropriate measures to cope with those
of our landings which took him by sur-
prise as regards both time and place.
In contrast to this, our landing at the
Cagayan sector in Mindanao was ~rried
out literally in front of the enemy and
in the midst of enemy air raids. That
entailed greater sacrifices for us, but we
succeeded in the long run. This opera-
tion is 8. fine proof that landing units can
penetrate through obstacles on the ~h
and through machine-gun positions if the
landing is carried out with firm deter-
mination and the proper fighting spirit.
Besides this sublime spirit of self-sacrifice,
it is of course also necessary that the
infantry units concerned should have been
specially trained for landings and fight-
ing, and that there is close co-operation
between the air force, infa.ntry, a.nd
engineering corps.
CORRlllOIDOR
Finally, a few lines regarding the forced
landing at Corregidor may be of interest.
This fortified island is shaped like a
tadpole 500 meters long and some 200
meters wide at its narrowest part. It
is almost entirely surrounded by pre-
cipitous cliffs, and its permanent batteries
were equipped with big guns of 37, 30,
25-centimeter calibers, etc. Besides this,
there were a large number of modem
mobile batteries, some sixty to seventy
antiaircraft guns, some three hundred
machine guns, and it was defended by
some 12,000 troops. Indeed, it seemed
an impregnable fortress. If one examines
the situation calmly, one might criticize
the idea of attempting a landing on it
as being reckless. However, once an
order has been given, our forces
know no such word as reckless
and do not consider the impos-
sible as impossible. They go
forward to dea,th with a firm
belief in victory. Herein lies the
strength of the Imperial forces.
This is also the main reason for
their success in attack.
The enemy defense at Corregidor was
very strong, and there was hardly an
inch for an ant to creep into. Almost
all of the surrounding cliffs did not per-
mit our men to climb up. The front
where the height and slope of the cliff
made a landing possible was very limi~.
Besides these, there were two further big
obstacles from a strategic point of view.
The first was that we had to bring th~
vessels needed for a landing from the
outer sea into Manila Bay, passing right
under the nose of the fortress batteri6$.
The second w~ that the enemy obstructed
our landing operations with speed torpedo
boats and more than twenty other small
war vessels. On the other hand, the
advantages on our side were the absolute
superiority of the Japanese air force and
the fact that our batteries on Bataan
Peninsula could effectively carry out ~
destructive advance bombardment as well
as co-operate closely with our lanmng
units. In this respect, the operation was
more like that of croeaing a big river
than a landing.
A. JilATTBR OPBPIRIT
If our forceS' attacking spirit and con-
fidence in victory had not been as ex-
cellent as they are, and if the American-
Filipino forces had had the spirit to figh~
to the last man, this landing operation
would doubtless have cost us greater
difficulties and sacrifices. The time has
not yet come to go into details about
this battle.
It may not be far wide of the mark
to say that, besides the application of
the old principle of taking the enemy by
surprise, the acquisition of command of
the sea and air is an inevitable condition
for the success of landing operations in
modern warfare. However, the. most
important thing is to have an
excellent morale born of burn-
ing patriotism, a fervent de-
termination to offer one's life
for one's country, as well as
firm confidence in victory,
and to carry out a bold opera-
tion with a superbly trained
, force.
. .!
